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Abstract 
This study investigates the implications of treating different environmental benefits 
as the primary target of policy design. We focus on two scenarios, estimating for both of 
them in-stream sediment, nutrient loadings, and carbon sequestration. In the first, we 
assess the impact of a program designed to improve water quality in Iowa on carbon 
sequestration, and in the second, we calculate the water quality impact of a program 
aimed at maximizing carbon sequestration. In both cases, the policy instrument is the 
retirement of land from agricultural production. 
Our results, limited to the state of Iowa, and to the case of set-aside for water quality 
or carbon sequestration purposes, indicate that the amount of co-benefits depends on 
what indicators are used to measure water quality. In general, this study shows that 
improving “water quality” in the sense of reducing nutrient or sediment loadings is too 
vague. Even if it is taken to refer to in-stream nutrients, because the responses of nitrogen 
and phosphorus to conservation efforts are not well correlated, this terminology may not 
provide much guidance.  
 
Keywords: carbon sequestration, co-benefits, environmental benefits targeting, Iowa, 
land set-aside, water quality. 
 
 
  
THE DESIGNATION OF CO-BENEFITS AND ITS IMPLICATION  
FOR POLICY: WATER QUALITY VERSUS  
CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN AGRICULTURAL SOILS 
The design of policies to induce the adoption or maintenance of conservation prac-
tices is often complicated by the fact that many conservation practices produce multiple 
benefits. For example, conservation tillage has the potential to sequester carbon as well as 
to reduce soil erosion. Likewise, land set aside and planted with grass or trees can im-
prove wildlife habit and stop or reduce nutrient runoff in addition to storing carbon and 
reducing erosion. If the social value of each benefit were known, then the total value 
from the multiple benefits could be summarized in a comprehensive index, and policy 
design would be straightforward: sound policy would aim to maximize the value of this 
index for any given budget.  
However, it is difficult to assess the value of benefits from conservation practices. 
Most of these goods are non-market and so monetary values are not always available, 
even if we know the environmental improvements in physical quantities. Water quality 
provides an apt example. There are many studies that estimate the value of improved 
water quality through contingent valuation methods or travel cost models; nonetheless, it 
is a challenging task to connect the “water quality” used in these studies (which is often 
represented by criteria such as whether a lake or river is swimmable, fishable, or boat-
able, etc.) to the “water quality” represented by the reduction of nutrient or sediment 
loading, the criterion typically used in actual measurement or water quality simulation 
models. Moreover, even the size of environmental improvements in physical quantities is 
a major task to assess, whether through costly direct measurement or complex and 
uncertain model simulations.   
There is a large body of literature that focuses on a single benefit from conservation 
practices. For example, there are many studies that investigate the cost of carbon seques-
tration without considering other benefits. Likewise, the least-cost way of improving 
water quality or nutrient loading in waterways has also been examined extensively (e.g., 
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Ribaudo et al. 2001), again largely without consideration for the other benefits of the 
practices that would implement the policy such as carbon sequestration. More recently 
there has been some attention paid to the multiple benefits of conservation practices. 
Often in this literature one benefit is treated as the primary benefit and others as co-
benefits (Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 2004), although the benefits have also been consid-
ered as a bundle. 
The views in the literature are mirrored in the historical development of at least some 
conservation programs. For example, in the early days of the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP), the primary land set-aside program in the United States, erosion reduc-
tion was the main focus. However, the current CRP takes into account a number of 
benefits through an index that gives weights to a variety of environmental factors. As 
reflected in the index, water quality receives more weight than carbon sequestration, but 
carbon is also included. 
In this paper, we investigate the implications of treating different environmental 
benefits as the primary target of policy design for the entire bundle of environmental 
benefits that society values. That is, when we consider other environmental goods as co-
benefits resulting from policies that sequester carbon rather than the focus of the pro-
grams, it implies that programs will target carbon sequestration more heavily. In contrast, 
if water quality is the focus of the program, it implies that the program will not heavily 
target carbon. We undertake an empirical study to demonstrate the importance of this 
issue in the context of a vital policy debate occurring in much of the midwestern United 
States related to the policies and conservation practices that will be necessary to improve 
water quality in local rivers and streams. In particular, we focus on two issues: (a) the 
carbon sequestration co-benefits of currently proposed and/or implemented programs 
designed to improve water quality and (b) the value of various bundles of water quality 
and carbon benefits associated with the programs and alternatives to the programs that 
focus more on carbon than on water quality. 
Understanding the carbon sequestration co-benefits of current programs and the degree 
to which changes in program design could increase carbon storage with relatively small 
trade-offs in other environmental benefits is a vital public policy issue. Further, we per-
ceive something of a mismatch between the focus that the academic literature has placed on 
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carbon sequestration and its co-benefits and the policy arena in which programs are more 
often being considered with a focus on water quality (making carbon the co-benefit). A 
large amount of money is expended on conservation in agriculture, much of which is meant 
for water quality, and many evaluation studies have shown that people are willing to pay 
for water quality improvement (for example, Lipton 2004 and Desvousges, Smith, and 
Fisher 1987). According to Ribaudo (1989), water quality benefits for the Corn Belt were 
greater than $80.00 per acre; the number was twice as high in the Lake States. In addition 
to the potential benefits, the National Needs Survey indicates that a large amount of 
funding may be needed to meet water quality needs. This implies that the nation might be 
poised to devote a large amount of resources to improving water quality. Undoubtedly, a 
co-benefit of these activities will be an increase in carbon sequestration and in this paper 
we will examine empirically the potential magnitude of carbon that can be achieved 
through programs mainly intended for water quality.  
Specifically, we study a set of policies designed to support the Clean Watersheds 
Needs Survey for the state of Iowa. This survey is required as part of the Clean Water Act 
and it requests that states identify the financial resources necessary to meet water quality 
goals from non-point source reductions (primarily in agriculture). As part of this effort 
we are performing an analysis of the costs of improving Iowa’s in-stream water quality 
by linking an economic model of farmers’ choices to a watershed-based hydrologic 
model, the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT).   
In the next section, we describe the water conservation “policy” developed to support 
the needs assessment for the state of Iowa and two additional policies focused on carbon 
sequestration. These form the basis for our comparisons and assessment of the magnitude 
of co-benefits. In section 2, we describe the estimation procedures and data we employ to 
estimate the costs and instream water quality benefits associated with these three policies. 
In section 3, basic results of the simulations are presented and interpreted. In section 4, 
we undertake a simple break-even type of analysis to examine the implicit “price” of 
nutrient and erosion reductions (measured at the edge of the field) that would be neces-
sary to make these policies pass a simple cost-benefit test. Lastly, we give our 
conclusions and final thoughts. 
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1. Conservation Policies for Water Quality and Carbon Sequestration 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to perform a periodic 
national Clean Watersheds Needs Survey in response to directives that were established 
in the 1972 U.S. Clean Water Act. The purpose of the survey is to identify all existing 
water quality or public health problems. As interpreted by the 2000 EPA National Needs 
Assessment (USEPA 2003), the process of determining the needs of states to address 
nonpoint source water quality problems consists of two steps. The first is the identifica-
tion of the set of conservation practices and land use changes that should be placed on the 
landscape, and the second is the estimation of the costs of those practices. As part of this 
process for the State of Iowa, in consultation with the Iowa Department of Natural 
Resources (IDNR), we determined the location of the practices based on the potential 
environmental impact as captured by several indicators, such as proximity to a stream, an 
erodibility index, and slope. Several practices were included in this exercise. Here, we 
consider a key one: land set-aside. We choose this practice to demonstrate the importance 
of the issues we raise because land set-aside is a major change in land use: it is both 
costly and land well suited for the sequestration of carbon is not necessarily well suited to 
the reduction of sediment and nutrient loadings to waterways. Thus, there is the possibil-
ity of very different efficient configurations of a policy designed to focus on carbon 
sequestration relative to water quality.  
The water quality improvement scenario studied here assumes that all land within 
100 feet of a waterway will be placed out of production and planted with perennials. This 
area amounts to about 251,600 acres. Additional land is retired based on the Erodibility 
Index (EI), until 10 percent of total cropland is retired from production. This amounts to 
an additional 2,172,100 acres. The EI index indicates the potential of a soil to erode, 
based on both climatic factors and the properties of the soil. A higher index indicates 
higher erodibility potential. The rationale for this choice is that choosing land closer to 
waterways to retire means that this land can filter sediment and pollutants from upstream 
farms. The highly erodible land, on the other hand, is highly correlated with elevated 
levels of sediment loss. The 10 percent cropland cap was chosen in concert with the 
IDNR, taking into account both the high level of impairment of Iowa’s waters and the 
issues linked with taking large areas of farmland out of production.1 
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We also consider carbon-focused policies by ranking each piece of land based on its 
ability to sequester carbon when retired from production. We then “enroll” land into the 
program based on the highest carbon benefit. To maintain comparability with the water 
quality scenario, we consider two cases. In the first, we keep constant the amount of acres 
enrolled in the set-aside program (i.e., we enroll acreage until a total of 10 percent of the 
cropland in the state is retired). In the second, we keep constant the cost of the program. 
That is, we enroll acreage into the program until the expenditure total is the same as the 
amount spent under the hypothetical water quality scenario. 
 
2. Data and Models 
To develop our models, we draw heavily from the National Resource Inventory 
(NRI) (USDA-NRCS 2003) to provide data on the land use, cropping history, and 
farming practices in the state of Iowa. The NRI is the most comprehensive data set on 
land use in the United States, and we use data on the 14,472 physical points in Iowa that 
represent cropland (Nusser and Goebel 1997). Conceptually, our data and models are 
based on individual producer and farm-level behavior, and we treat an NRI point as a 
producer with a farm size equal to the number of acres represented by the point (the 
expansion factor provided by the survey). Figure 1 illustrates the 35 watersheds corre-
sponding to the eight-digit Hydrologic Cataloging Units of the United States Geological 
Survey that are largely contained in the state and that are modeled in this study. 
The costs of enrolling into the land set-aside program are estimated using the model 
developed in Feng et al. (2004), in which the opportunity cost of land retirement is 
determined by using the cropland cash rental rate. The average cost of land retirement in 
the sample is $123 per acre with a standard deviation of $21 per acre. The rental rates are 
the highest in the central and northern parts of Iowa, averaging as high as almost $140 
per acre in subwatersheds of the Iowa and Wapsipinicon rivers (Figure 1). The least 
expensive land to retire from crop production is in the southern portion of the Des 
Moines River as well as in the Nishnabotna and Nodaway river watersheds where the 
average land retirement cost is as low as $105 per acre. 
To compute the amount of carbon sequestered when an NRI point is retired from 
cropland, we rely on estimates from the Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC)  
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FIGURE 1. Study area and watershed delineations 
 
model version 3060 (Izaurralde et al. 2002). The current version of the EPIC model 
features enhanced carbon cycling routines (Izaurralde et al. 2002) that are based on the 
approach used in the Century model (http://www.nrel.colostate.edu/projects/century5/ 
reference/index.htm; Parton et al. 1994). More generally, EPIC is a model that estimates 
the changes in erosion, carbon sequestration, and nutrient runoff measured at the edge of 
the field from changing farming practices. Inputs into the model include weather, soil, 
landscape, crop rotation, and management system parameters. When land is retired from 
crop production, we assume that annual grasses are planted and maintained on the land 
and we run a 30-year simulation with EPIC to predict the carbon sequestration level 
associated with this change. For each NRI point, we also calculate the soil erosion 
reduction at the edge of the field.   
In addition to EPIC, we also rely on estimates from a watershed-based model to as-
sess the conservation policies. Unlike carbon sequestration, a key concern in the design 
and implementation of policies to improve water quality is to recognize that there are 
critical interactions between land uses within a watershed that affect the total water 
The Designation of Co-benefits and Its Implication for Policy / 7 
 
quality level obtained. Thus, for otherwise identical tracts of land, more water quality 
improvement may occur from retiring a piece of land from production that is located 
downstream from numerous other cropped points. The potential filtering effect is just one 
example of the physical processes that a fully integrated watershed hydrological model 
should capture. So that we can study in-stream water quality changes, we employ SWAT 
to estimate changes in nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment loads from retiring a particu-
lar set of parcels from production within a watershed. The model represents hydrology, 
plant growth, erosion, fate, and transport and various management practices (Arnold et al. 
1998 and Neitsch et al. 2002). The SWAT model achieves a high level of spatial differen-
tiation by dividing a large watershed into a number of subwatersheds and then dividing 
further into Hydrologic Response Units (HRUs). Each HRU represents homogeneous 
land use, management, and soil characteristics. To estimate the in-stream water quality 
consequences of the increase in land set-aside, we have calibrated the SWAT model for 
each of the watersheds identified in Figure 1 to baseline levels.2 By running the model at 
the set-aside levels “after” the policy, we can compute the changes in water quality 
attributable to the increase in land set-aside.  
Given that political boundaries and watershed boundaries do not perfectly corre-
spond in Iowa, there is something of a geographic mismatch between our study regions 
on the cost side and those on the water quality side.  
The watersheds studied correspond to 13 outlets, at which the in-stream water quality 
is measured. The water quality measures of interest are sediment, nitrogen, and phospho-
rus. For the cost analysis we consider placing the identified set of practices all across the 
state and exclude the pieces of the watersheds that fall outside of the state boundaries (for 
example, the section of the Des Moines River watershed that falls in Minnesota). Thus, 
the costs and water quality benefits we report are not quite consummate: one represents a 
political boundary (the statewide costs); the other represents a natural system boundary. 
Direct comparisons between the aggregate cost and water quality benefit may be mislead-
ing, although the unit costs and benefits (per acre costs and/or per outlet of the watershed 
measures) can still be appropriately compared. 
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3. Results 
The three policies considered are quite similar in terms of the acreage enrolled, as 
shown in Table 1. However, Figures 2, 3, and 4 show that the location of those acres is 
very different. The water quality policy would enroll more acres along the Mississippi 
and Missouri rivers, in the more hilly parts of the state. The carbon policies, on the other 
hand, would focus on the central part of Iowa, in the ecoregion known as the Des Moines 
Lobe, a flat area with very productive agriculture, which is particularly suited for carbon 
sequestration. Note the similarities between Figures 3 and 4. Because the criterion used to 
enroll land is the same, the only difference is the additional amount of land allowed in the 
equal area scenario.  
The policies are extremely different in the levels and locations of environmental 
benefits. The carbon-based policies sequester about 10 times as much carbon as the 
policy based on water quality. Similarly, the water quality policy is around four times 
more effective than the carbon-based policies in reducing soil erosion at the edge of the 
field as calculated with EPIC.  
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the location of the carbon sequestered across the state in the 
water quality policy and in the carbon policy that keeps costs constant,3 and Figures 7 and 
8 show the location of the edge-of-field soil erosion reduction across the watersheds 
studied. As with the levels of the benefits, we find the location of the benefits to be  
 
TABLE 1. Simulation results 
Policy 
Budget, 
(mil. $) 
Area 
Enrolled 
(mil. 
acres) 
Carbon 
Sequestered 
(mmt) 
Erosion 
Reduction 
(Edge of 
Field) 
(mmt) 
Sediment 
Load 
Reduction  
(In Stream) 
(mmt) 
Nitrates 
load 
reduction 
(In 
Stream) 
(tmt) 
Total P 
Load 
Reduction 
(In 
Stream) 
(tmt) 
Water 
quality 242.1 2.2 0.3 16.0 2.2 2.47 1.49 
Carbon, 
equal area 287.0 2.2 3.1 4.0 0.0 10.05 0.81 
Carbon, 
equal cost 242.1 1.9 2.7 3.5 0.0 8.96 0.57 
Note: The carbon and edge of field reductions are calculated for the state, while the in-stream water quality measures are 
the sum of the reductions across the 13 watersheds of Figure 1. Therefore, the numbers are not exactly commensurate. 
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FIGURE 2. Set-aside acres—water quality policy 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Set-aside acres—carbon policy with equal cost 
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FIGURE 4. Set-aside acres—carbon policy with equal acres 
 
 
FIGURE 5. Carbon sequestration from water quality policy 
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FIGURE 6. Carbon sequestration from carbon policy with equal cost 
 
FIGURE 7. Edge-of-field erosion reduction from water quality policy 
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FIGURE 8. Edge-of-field erosion reduction from carbon policy with equal cost 
quite different across the policy designs. The extreme differences are at least partly 
driven by the fact that both policies are affecting only a relatively small percentage of the 
cropland. More substantial overlap of benefits could occur in policies applying to more 
extensive areas, as was found in the case of conservation tillage adoption in Iowa (Kurka-
lova, Kling, and Zhao 2004). 
The policy design also substantially alters the in-stream water quality impacts, as re-
ported in Tables 2 and 3. For a water quality policy (Table 2), with only one exception, 
sediment is reduced across all the watersheds from the baseline.4 Since the enrollment 
criterion was the EI, this is an expected result. If we sum the sediment loads across the 
watersheds, the total reduction is 11 percent. The higher reductions are along the Missis-
sippi River and in Southwest Iowa, reflecting the watersheds where more land is put out 
of production. Reductions in phosphorus loads are somewhat smaller, but still significant, 
as phosphorus loads are linked to sediment. The policy, however, is not effective in 
reducing nitrates, and, since nitrates are the most important form of nitrogen in surface 
water, total nitrogen is not reduced by much.  
In contrast, for a carbon policy (equal cost) (Table 3), we find that in several water-
sheds, particularly in eastern Iowa, the sediment loadings actually increase. Further  
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TABLE 2. Percentage reduction in sediment, N and P in stream for CRP water 
quality policy 
    Sediment Nitrate Org N Total N Org P Min P Total P 
1 Floyd  4  -2  3  -1  1  -4  -3 
2 Monona  6  -2  10  0  11  7  8 
3 Little Sioux  -2  -9  8  -6  13  6  7 
4 Boyer  17  0  19  5  19  17  17 
5 Nishnabotna  25  0  15  3  15  18  18 
6 Nodaway  21  6  20  10  20  19  19 
7 Des Moines  3  3  8  5  9  6  7 
8 Skunk  20  7  15  8  14  15  15 
9 Iowa  1  4  0  2  0  5  1 
10 Wapsipinicon  4  -2  -4  -2  -2  -11  -9 
11 Maquoketa  11  -2  11  0  9  9  9 
12 Turkey  19  1  14  3  14  13  13 
13 Upper Iowa  13  2  6  3  0  3  2 
 Total   11  1  5  2  4  7  6 
 
TABLE 3. Percentage reduction in sediment, N and P in stream for CRP carbon 
(equal cost) policy 
    Sediment Nitrate Org N Total N Org P Min P Total P 
1 Floyd  0  2  -1  1  -3  -8  -7 
2 Monona  0  1  -1  1  0  -3  -2 
3 Little Sioux  0  -1  1  0  0  2  2 
4 Boyer  2  2  1  2  1  1  1 
5 Nishnabotna  -1  -3  0  -2  1  -1  0 
6 Nodaway  12  3  12  6  12  12  12 
7 Des Moines  0  8  9  9  8  9  9 
8 Skunk  5  4  4  4  4  4  4 
9 Iowa  1  9  3  6  2  2  2 
10 Wapsipinicon  -7  -1  -15  -3  -15  -17  -16 
11 Maquoketa  -3  1  -12  -1  -11  -11  -11 
12 Turkey  -8  1  -4  0  -4  -4  -4 
13 Upper Iowa  1  -1  -1  -1  0  -3  -2 
 Total   0  4  3  4  3  2  2 
 
investigations on this result are needed, but the likely reason for this finding is the fact that 
the NRI points selected for carbon sequestration purposes in these areas were farmed with 
effective conservation practices such as filter strips and grassed waterways that actually 
were more effective at capturing sediment in our modeling system. On the other hand, it is 
interesting to note that the carbon-based policies are better than the water quality policy in 
reducing nitrates. The reason is that the land taken out of production in the carbon-based 
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policies is prime agricultural land, heavily fertilized. The higher reductions are in the central 
watersheds of the Des Moines Lobe, where most of the acres of set-aside in the carbon-
based scenarios are located. These results suggest that even a water quality–based policy 
may have to deal with trade-offs, depending on which measure of water quality is used. 
Implicit in our set up was a heavier weight on the importance of sediment and phosphorus 
loadings reduction, since the NRI points were selected based on land erodibility.  
 
4. Indirect Monetization and Lessons for Policy Design 
As noted in the introduction, it is not straightforward to assign monetary values to 
the nonmarket goods of reduced nutrients or soil erosion. It is also not straightforward to 
assign a monetary value associated with sequestered carbon, although a number of 
analyses have been undertaken that suggest likely values of the price of carbon in an 
efficient and fully functioning trading program. In this section, we undertake a simple 
break-even type of analysis to consider the marginal value of erosion and nutrient reduc-
tions that would have to hold under a range of likely carbon prices to make the alternative 
policies socially efficient, that is, to be assured that they would pass a simple cost-benefit 
test. We are implicitly assuming in this exercise that the hypothetical carbon prices would 
reflect the social value of carbon reductions.  
First, we estimate the minimum value of erosion reduction that would have to be 
held by society to justify the policy outlay. This is calculated assuming that that the total 
cost of the policy must be equal to the monetary valuation of the benefits from the policy. 
Two benefits are considered at a time: carbon sequestration and erosion reduction. The 
monetary valuation of the benefits is equal to the monetary valuation of carbon sequestra-
tion, C , multiplied by its price, Cp , plus the monetary valuation of erosion reduction, E , 
multiplied by its price, Ep . Thus, for the policy to “break even,” we need 
C EC p E p Budget⋅ + ⋅ = . For the scenarios considered, we have the Budget , C , and E . 
The literature provides several estimates of Cp . We use these pieces of information to 
find Ep  from the previous equation. Specifically, we consider three prices for carbon, 
Cp = 10, 50, and 100, and get three prices for erosion, Ep , for each of the scenarios 
considered. The results are reported in Table 4. At high enough carbon prices, carbon  
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TABLE 4. Simulation results: Break-even price of erosion ($ per metric ton) 
Policy 
Carbon Price of $10 
per mt 
Carbon price of $50 
per mt 
Carbon price of $100 
per mt 
Water quality 14.9 14.2 13.3 
Carbon, equal area 64.5 33.6 -5.0 
Carbon, equal cost 61.4 31.1 -6.8 
 
benefits are more than enough to justify these carbon-based policies. On the other hand, if 
the goal of the policy is to improve water quality/reduce erosion, increasing the price of 
carbon will not affect the value of erosion reduction. The reason is that the water quality 
policy reduces erosion by 16 million metric tons, versus 0.3 million tons of carbon 
sequestered. Carbon prices would have to rise much higher than $100/metric ton to affect 
the break-even price of erosion. Pimentel et al. (1995) estimate an off-site5 cost of erosion 
of about $3 a ton in 1992 dollars. This estimate assumes that more than half of the costs 
are caused by wind erosion and does not consider biological impacts such as the effect on 
biodiversity. As the authors of the study note, this is likely to underestimate the impact of 
soil erosion. However, even tripling the number calculated by Pimentel et al. would 
produce prices lower that the lowest implicit break-even prices from our scenarios. This 
suggests that a land set-aside policy is unlikely to be justified on the grounds of soil 
erosion alone.   
The calculation of break-even prices for in-stream pollutant load reductions is more 
complex to interpret for several reasons. First, there is less precedent on how the reduc-
tion should be measured, and therefore there is no consensus on how the benefits should 
be compared. We are using reductions in metric tons of the loads at the outlet of each 
watershed, but, as we noted earlier, this does not directly correlate with measures such as 
swimmability and transparency. The units of analysis are not immediately apparent 
either. For example, Table 5 reports the break-even prices for total phosphorus load 
reductions, using metric tons of reduction as the common unit. Because the edge-of-field 
values are much higher than the reductions in-stream, the price of phosphorus load 
reductions is extremely high compared to the price of carbon.  
An alternative way to assess the trade-offs is to present the budget outlays for each 
benefit, either in dollar terms or in percentages, as illustrated in Table 6. This allows a 
comparison of the trade-offs involved without having to decide the appropriate units of  
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TABLE 5. Simulation results: Break-even price of total P load reduction ($ per 
metric ton) 
Policy 
Carbon Price of $10 
per mt 
Carbon price of $50 
per mt 
Carbon price of $100 
per mt 
Water quality 51,540.3  152,540.4  142,800.2  
Carbon, equal area 60,373.0  164,781.7  -24,736.1 
Carbon, equal cost 70,488.1  190,620.3  -41,870.7 
 
 
 
TABLE 6. Simulation results: Budget break-up (percentage values in parentheses) 
Policy  
Carbon Price of $10 
per mt 
Carbon price of $50 
per mt 
Carbon price of $100 
per mt 
Carbon 2,905,800 
 (1.2%) 
14,529,000 
 (6.0%) 
29,058,000 
 (12.0%) Water quality 
Co-benefit 239,162,090 
(98.8.0%) 
227,538,890 
(94.0%) 
213,009,890 
(88.0%) 
 
Carbon 
 
30,698,440 
(10.7%) 
 
153,492,200 
(53.5%) 
 
306,984,400 
(107.0%) 
 
Carbon,  
equal area Co-benefit 256,252,000 
(89.3%) 
133,458,240 
(46.5%) 
-20,033,960 
(-7.0%) 
 
Carbon 
 
26,602,270 
(11.0%) 
 
133,011,350 
(54.9%) 
 
266,022,700 
(109.9%) 
 
Carbon,  
equal cost Co-benefit 215,465,620 
(89.0%) 
109,056,540 
(45.1%) 
-23,954,810 
(-9.9%) 
 
comparison. Clearly, this is an issue that needs further investigation and additional 
empirical analysis of various categories of co-benefits.   
Additional analysis is also needed because, as our results show, viewing different 
benefit indicators as the primary benefits and other indicators as co-benefits in policy 
making would produce substantially different policy scenarios. In particular, there should 
be careful consideration of the environmental goals of conservation policies implemented 
on only a fraction of cropland because the trade-offs for such programs are likely to be 
more extreme. Policies included in this category, besides land set-aside, are likely to be 
wetland conversion and adoption of no till, as opposed to reduced/mulch till, which is 
likely to be more widespread.  
Though our results are limited to the state of Iowa, and to the case of set-aside for wa-
ter quality or carbon sequestration purposes, it is apparent that at our scale of analysis, the 
amount of co-benefits depends on what indicators are used to measure water quality. Local 
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water quality issues are usually linked with phosphorus, since phosphorus tends to be the 
limiting factor in freshwater bodies. However, at least until recently, there was a consensus 
that nitrogen was the main cause of hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico. In general, this study 
shows that improving “water quality” in the sense of reducing nutrient or sediment loadings 
is too vague. Even if this is taken to refer to in-stream nutrients, because the responses of 
nitrogen and phosphorus to conservation efforts are not well correlated, this terminology 
may not provide much guidance. In the case of the CRP’s environmental benefits index, for 
example, the water quality benefits refer both to a generic impairment that includes nutri-
ents and specifically to sediment (USDA-FSA 2004).  
We have not considered co-benefits such as wildlife habitat or biodiversity, which 
are harder to assess because they have only indirect links to “hard” environmental 
indicators such as water quality and depend on a large number of factors. However, the 
scenario results provide some indication of the issues involved with including these co-
benefits. For example, the GAP (Gap Analysis Program) for Iowa suggests that species 
richness for mammals, birds, amphibians, and reptiles is higher along the Mississippi and 
Missouri rivers, and in southern Iowa (Kane et al. 2003). The Des Moines Lobe area, 
where it would be more efficient to retire land for carbon sequestration purposes, has 
lower biodiversity, since the land is intensely cropped, and there are few forests, grass-
lands, and rivers. This indicates that a land set-aside program similar in size to those 
analyzed here, and designed to preserve biodiversity, would focus largely on the same 
areas as our water quality scenario. 
In terms of policy design, our results support the use of different instruments (pro-
grams) to achieve different environmental goals. A weighted index could also be used. In 
such a case, because the overlap of benefits can be modest, the weights would essentially 
reflect the relative priority of each environmental improvement category and its share of 
the budget.  
  
Endnotes 
1. Note that this area is in addition to the already existing CRP area.  
2. The details of the calibration and validation process for SWAT can be found in Jha et 
al. 2005 and Gassman et al. 2005. 
3. The two carbon policies are very similar; therefore, only the results for the equal cost 
case are shown. 
4. See the appendix for the baseline loads. 
5. We do not consider the on-site impacts of soil erosion because they directly affect 
productivity and should be accounted for in the farmer’s profit-maximizing problem. 
  
Appendix 
 
Baseline Loads 
 
 
Baseline Loadings 
Annual Average Values in Metric Tons (1980-1997) 
Baseline Sediment Nitrate Org N Total N Org P Min P Total P 
1 Floyd 241,423 7,125 1,281 8,406 104 301 405 
2 Monona 198,589 4,847 757 5,605 58 269 327 
3 Little Sioux 632,456 23,851 4,730 28,569 381 1,687 2,067 
4 Boyer 777,245 4,947 2,044 6,991 161 548 709 
5 Nishnabotna 1,968,399 8,257 2,399 10,656 207 794 1,001 
6 Nodaway 520,045 3,312 1,344 4,656 113 405 518 
7 Des Moines 2,174,303 38,252 25,098 63,349 2,411 4,664 7,075 
8 Skunk 3,800,345 28,122 3,965 32,087 343 1,678 2,021 
9 Iowa 3,423,237 54,050 49,688 103,738 7,000 786 7,786 
10 Wapsipinicon 2,238,966 27,533 3,950 31,484 342 1,228 1,571 
11 Maquoketa 1,218,739 14,781 2,965 17,746 245 674 919 
12 Turkey 1,297,814 12,436 2,406 14,842 208 642 850 
13 Upper Iowa 730,155 3,675 1,008 4,683 112 267 379 
 Total 19,221,717 231,188 101,635 332,811 11,686 13,943 25,629 
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